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PROSECUTION OF PROCESS CRIMES: THOUGHTS AND
TRENDS
KAREN PATTON SEYMOUR* STEVEN

R.

PEIKIN** ALLISON CAFFARONE**

The United States Department of Justice has come under attack in recent years
because of its increased attention to, and prosecution of, crimes committed during the
course of its investigations '-obstruction of justice,2 perjury,3 and making false
statements.4 These crimes have been labeled "cover-up ' 5 or "process crimes," 6 and
the charging prosecutors have been criticized as bringing such charges only against
* Karen Patton Seymour is a partner at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and heads the firm's Criminal
Defense and Investigations Group. Her practice focuses on white-collar criminal defense and internal
investigations. From 2002-2004, Ms. Seymour served as the Chief of the Criminal Division for the United
States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, where she was lead trial counsel for the
government in the prosecution of Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic.
** Steven Peikin is a partner at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, where he is a member of the firm's
Criminal Defense and Investigations Group. He was an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern
District of New York for eight years, including service as Chief of the Office's Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force.
*** Allison Caffarone is an associate in Sullivan & Cromwell's Criminal Defense and Investigations
Group.
1. Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Div., Remarks to the
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Mid-South Chapter (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pr/ speeches/2004/09/2004_2954_rmks2CFCTN090204.pdf ("I also want to
offer you some quick observations about three other areas we're tying to give renewed emphases:
aggressive response to efforts to obstruct criminal or administrative investigations .... "); see also id.
("Just as we're looking harder at the extent of a company's cooperation, we're also taking obstructive
conduct more seriously, and not just in our own investigations.").
2. Arthur Andersen, Enron's accounting firm, was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512 for
allegedly instructing its employees to destroy documents pursuant to its document retention policy.
Section 1512 provides, in part, that it is a crime to "alter, destroy, mutilate or conceal an object with
intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding." See Arthur
Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005). Martha Stewart was charged with obstruction
of agency proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 for providing false and misleading information to the SEC
regarding her sale of ImClone stock. See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 280 (2d Cir. 2006).
Frank Quattrone, a senior officer of CSFB, was charged with obstructing justice under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503,
1505, and 1512 for allegedly directing the destruction of documents relating to IPOs that were the subject
of regulatory and law enforcement investigations. See United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 170 n.18
(2d Cir. 2006).
3. Major League Baseball player Barry Bonds was recently charged with perjury regarding his use of
steroids under 18 U.S.C. § 1621, which provides in part that whoever has "taken an oath before a
competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath
to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states
or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true ... is guilty of perjury." See Duff
Wilson & Michael S. Schmidt, Bonds Charged With Perjury in Steroids Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007,
at Al.
4. Martha Stewart was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which provides in part, "[w]hoever, in
any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and
willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up ... a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." See Stewart,
433 F.3d at 280.
5. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar Criminal
Law, 43 Hous. L. REv. 591, 607 (2006); see also Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9, 17-24 (2005).
6. See Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1333 (2006); see also
David Chase & Neal Wilson, When the SEC Comes Knocking, Bus. L. TODAY, May/June 2000, available
at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/blt00may-sec.html.
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high-profile defendants as to whom there is insufficient evidence to charge the "more
serious" underlying offenses that prompted the initial investigation. 7 Some critics
have gone so far as to label these prosecutions "vindictive." 8
Much of this criticism is misplaced. These are serious-not minor-crimes, wholly
deserving of prosecutorial attention and which, if ignored, threaten to undermine the
integrity of our criminal justice system. In our adversarial system of justice,-individuals have near-absolute rights to refuse to testify or to refuse to speak to investigators.
Ignoring perjury and obstructive conduct poses a risk of diminishing the significance
of these important rights.
It is also clear, however, that federal prosecutors must exercise restraint and refrain
from attempting to characterize legitimate defensive conduct as obstruction. Criminal
charges should not be brought against individuals when their alleged obstructive
conduct is not sufficiently tied to an official proceeding. It is troublesome when, for
example, prosecutors stretch obstruction law to attempt to reach allegedly false
statements made in the context of an internal corporate investigation. As the Supreme
Court held in United States v. Aguilar, there must be a sufficient nexus between the
alleged obstruction of justice and the judicial or grand jury proceeding that the
accused is alleged to have intended to obstruct. 9
While the Court's holding in Aguilar was limited to 18 U.S.C. § 1503, commonly
known as the "Omnibus Obstruction Provision," the Court's reasoning should be
extended to cover each of the statutes discussed herein. Indeed, when prosecutors fail
to extend Aguilar's reasoning-and fail to read a nexus requirement into these
statutes-individuals are deprived of their constitutional right to fair notice of the
forbidden conduct. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, a
criminal statute must be sufficiently definite such that it gives a "person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute."'
To avoid impermissible vagueness, "a penal statute [must] define the criminal offense
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement."'" The consequences to those charged with obstructive conduct are
considerable, and citizens have a right to understand exactly what conduct falls
within the statute's prohibitions. When prosecutors pin the "obstruction" label on all
false or misleading statements, regardless of whether they are made to government

7. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political
Economy of PretextualProsecution, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 583, 614 & n.l1 (2005); see also Barbara Amiel,
Rain Over Martha, N.Y. SUN, June 10, 2003, at 6 ("They are prosecuting Ms. Stewart for who she is
because on the core charge of insider trading they do not have enough evidence.").
8. For example, Professor Stephen Bainbridge wrote:
I find something vaguely Star Chamberish about the Quattrone conviction, just as I did with
respect to the earlier Martha Stewart conviction. In neither case did the government indict the
defendant with respect to the alleged underlying violations. Instead, both were indicted for
subsequent acts that allegedly obstructed the investigation. Yet, if that investigation did not
result in charges, it seems vindictive to charge obstruction (especially since in neither case was
the obstruction very successful in interfering with the investigation).
Green, supra note 5, at 12-13 (quoting Stephen Bainbridge). Similarly, Howard Chapman wrote, "In the
Martha Stewart case, doesn't it look like the prosecutors are angry because they can't prove insider
trading, and are being vindictive in pursuing these other charges?" Howard Chapman, Both Martha and
Justice Have Suffered, and Now It Will Get Even Worse, FORT WAYNE NEWS-SEmNEL, Mar. 12, 2004,
available at http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&program=Misc

&id= 1926.
9. 515 U.S. 593, 599-600 (1995).
10. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
11. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
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officials, the contours of legal and illegal conduct are rendered dangerously unclear.
In the words of Sir Thomas More, "[t]he law is a causeway upon which, so long as he
keeps to it, a citizen may walk safely." 12 When the line between what does and does
not constitute a crime blurs, this causeway's edges crumble.
Some of the criticism of obstruction and perjury prosecutions-particularly those
involving high-profile defendants-stems from the misconception that proving such
crimes is easy, and that these crimes are pursued to conserve prosecutorial resources
or win "easy" convictions. In actuality, proving perjury and obstruction is often
extraordinarily difficult and can take considerable time and energy. While many
instances of perjury and obstruction committed by ordinary, unknown individuals go
uncharged, that is no surprise given the difficulty of proving such offenses and the
scarcity of prosecutorial resources. Just because the system cannot pursue every
instance, though, should not lead to the conclusion that the system should not
prosecute any instance of such conduct. Prosecutors must bring such cases to uphold
the integrity of the criminal process and must, when possible, prosecute those 13people
who commit these crimes, regardless of whether they are famous or unknown.
Given resource constraints and the fact that not all process crimes can be prosecuted, prosecutors must look at a variety of factors in making their charging
decisions. Where possible, the prosecution of well-known defendants provides an
added benefit-"the deterrent effect is immeasurable." 1 4 Prior to the high-profile
prosecutions of Arthur Andersen and Martha Stewart, public awareness of obstruction
crimes was limited. Prosecution of well-known individuals and entities undoubtedly
deters the same behavior by those lesser-known. But this result, while desirable,
should not alone be the reason prosecutors bring such cases.15
The importance of ensuring truthfulness during the criminal investigation process
cannot seriously be questioned-to do so is to question the importance of ensuring
the integrity of our legal system. Witness testimony typically forms the crux of any
criminal case. A witness whose false testimony leads to the wrongful conviction of an
innocent person has done enormous harm not only to the wrongfully accused, but
also to public confidence in the integrity of the criminal process as a whole. If
obstruction of justice and perjury are left unpunished, what is to deter a person from
wrongfully accusing an innocent person? What will deter people from lying when
telling the truth might lead to harmful consequences for themselves? "Individuals
who lie to federal agents interfere with the government's ability to investigate
criminal conduct and undermine the efficiency of government investigations.," 6
12. United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR
ALL SEASONS 89 (Vintage 1960) (speech of Sir Thomas More)).
13. Despite commentary to the contrary, statistical data belie the contention that only high-profile
defendants are charged with perjury, obstruction of justice, and making false statements. Indeed, all but a
handful of cases in which these crimes are charged do not involve well-known individuals. From 2001 to
2006 there were 1,153 criminal cases filed in United States District Courts charging obstruction of justice
and 529 cases charging perjury. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, THE SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl.5.10.2006 (31st ed. 2008), available at http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t5102006.pdf. From 2001 to 2006 there were 5,328 criminal cases filed in the United
States charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001 as the lead charge. See TRAC Reports, Inc., TRACCriminal Enforcement (2007), http://tracfed.syr.edu/index/crimindex.html (last visited May 11, 2008).
14. Kurt Eichenwald, ProsecutorsHave Reasons for Stalking Celebrities, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003, at
C4 (quoting Christopher Bebel, former Securities and Exchange Commission lawyer and federal prosecutor).
15. Id. ("Martha Stewart [was] prosecuted not for who she is, but for what she did." (quoting James B.
Comey, then United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York)).
16. Lynn Zinser & Michael S. Schmidt, Jones Admits to Doping and Enters Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2007, at Dl (quoting Scott N. Schools, United States Attorney for the Northern District of
California).
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While obstructive behavior may be far from rare, the criminal justice system plainly
benefits from deterring this conduct through the threat of prosecution.
This is especially appropriate in the United States, where a criminal defendant's
right against self-incrimination is secured by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Under U.S. law, a criminal defendant at trial has an absolute right to silence-he
need not take the witness stand, and the fact-finder is not permitted to hold his silence
against him. It is precisely this right to silence that allows for the rigorous enforcement of process crimes. Indeed, if we value this right to remain silent, then society
should ensure that when people choose to speak to the government, they do so
truthfully.
Today, most common and civil law jurisdictions recognize some version of a right
to silence, but outside of and in comparison to the United States, the right is limited
in many respects. In the common law jurisdiction of England, for example, prosecutors may comment during trial on a defendant's unwillingness to answer questions
and juries may draw adverse inferences from his silence. 17 Additionally, an individual
cannot stop police questioning by invoking his or her right to silence.'
In the civil law jurisdiction of France, an individual's right to silence extends to
judicial proceedings, but does not cover police interrogations. 9 As in most civil law
jurisdictions, France has an inquisitorial rather than adversarial system of justice. The
defendant, although not placed under oath, is the first person to be questioned at
trial. 20 And although he has a right to silence, if the defendant chooses not to speak,
the court may draw an adverse inference from his silence. 2 '
In certain socialist or communist nations, there is simply no right to silence.22
have an affirmative obligation to
Under Chinese law, for example, Chinese suspects
23
answer any and all questions posed to them.
It is no surprise that in these jurisdictions, therefore, defendants often assert their
innocence and make false exculpatory statements; such is to be expected and to a
large degree is tolerated. 24 But in the United States, defendants are not required to
speak with investigators or to testify; they have the right to remain silent, and their
silence may not be held against them in any criminal proceedings. If we begin to
tolerate defendants' false assertions of innocence and exculpatory statements in
official proceedings-or worse, if we begin to expect such statements-our comparatively broad right to silence becomes unnecessary and begins to slowly lose its
significance.2 5

17. See Erik Luna, A Placefor ComparativeCriminalProcedure, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 277, 315 (2004).
18. Id.
19. Jeffrey K. Walke, A Comparative Discussion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 14

N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 19 (1993).
20. Luna, supra note 17, at 316.
21. Id.

22. See Walke, supra note 19, at 27 ("Although sometimes viewed as a distinct form, socialist
jurisdictions are generally codified civil law jurisdictions with peculiarly socialist substantive law. Many
of these jurisdictions recognize an accused's right to silence.").
23. Luna, supra note 17, at 317.
24. See INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, CARTELS WORKING GROUP, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE IN CARTEL
INVESTIGATIONS (2006), available at http:llwww.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/libraryl
conference_5th_capetown_2006/ObstructionPaper-with-cover.pdf (finding that other than the United States
Department of Justice, most anti-cartel enforcers were not prosecuting acts of obstruction in cartel cases;
of the fifteen jurisdictions included in the report, only the United States and Canada prosecuted an oral
false statement case within the last five years).
25. The Supreme Court has held that there is no exception to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001
for a false statement that constituted a mere denial of guilt. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398,
408 (1997). Prior to Brogan, seven circuits had recognized this "exculpatory no" exception. See Moser v.
United States, 18 F.3d 469, 473-74 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 805 (8th Cir.
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For these reasons, prosecution of these crimes is imperative and should remain a
high priority. But these laws should not be stretched to reach instances where the
alleged obstruction is far removed from the government investigation or judicial
proceeding that was allegedly obstructed. There is a considerable difference between
cases where a defendant lies directly to government officials or to a grand jury and
cases where, for example, a defendant lies to a lawyer hired by a company's audit
committee during an internal corporate investigation.
In 1995, the Supreme Court reversed the obstruction of justice conviction of a
federal judge, holding that in order to be guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1503, there
must be a sufficient nexus between the alleged obstruction of justice and the judicial
or grand jury proceeding that the accused is alleged to have intended to obstruct.2 6 To
satisfy this nexus requirement, the alleged obstructive conduct must have some
"relationship in time, causation, or logic" to a judicial proceeding such that the
"natural and probable effect" of the conduct is to interfere with justice.27 The Court
held that even though the judge had lied to FBI agents who had specifically advised
him that a grand jury investigation had commenced, he was not liable for obstructing
justice because "[t]he action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence
judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence
some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court's or
grand jury's authority., 28 The crucial point was that even though the defendant was
aware of the pending judicial proceeding, there was no evidence that he knew that his
false statements would be provided to the grand jury. In the words of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, "[w]e do not believe that uttering false statements to an investigating
agent-and that seems to be all that was proved here-who might or might not testify
before a grand jury is sufficient to make out a violation of the catch-all provision of
§1503. ' ' 29 In addition to obstruction of justice, Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning
regarding the required nexus between the accused's conduct and a judicial proceeding
applies with equal force to perjury and false statements.
Unfortunately, prosecutors do not always enforce the process crime statutes with
an Aguilar-type nexus in mind. For example, in 2004, the United States Attorney's
Office for the Eastern District of New York charged three former executives of
Computer Associates International, Inc. with obstruction of justice under § 1512(c)
for making false statements to their own company's lawyers. 3' The three executives
allegedly "failed to disclose, falsely denied and concealed" the existence of certain
accounting practices to lawyers hired by the company's audit committee to conduct
an internal investigation. 3' Alleging that the defendants knew and intended that the
lawyers would present these false findings to the government, the prosecutors charged
the executives with obstruction of justice. This strained theory has since been adopted
by a number of other prosecutors.32
1990); United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Cogdell,
844 F.2d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 717-19 (1lth Cir. 1986); United
States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 880-81 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178,
183-84 (1st Cir. 1975).
26. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599-600 (1995).
27. Id.

28. Id. at 599 (citing United States v. Brown, 688 F. 2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1982)).
29. Id. at 600.
30. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Computer Associates Executives Indicted on
Securities Fraud, Obstruction Charges (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/

September/04_crm.642.htm.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Stockman, No. 07-0220 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 21, 2007)
(prosecutors in the Southern District of New York indicted David Stockman and others of Collins &
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This theory represents a misuse of the obstruction statutes. While it is important to
prosecute process crimes, it is equally important to refrain from prosecuting individuals where the Aguilar nexus is absent or stretched so far that it loses all meaning.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, individuals are guaranteed
the right to fair notice before the government may deprive them of a protected liberty
interest. Where criminal statutes are insufficiently definite to provide such notice,
such statutes will be struck down as impremissibly vague.3 3 The Supreme Court has
explained that the most important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is establishing
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement: "Where the legislature fails to
provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standardless sweep
[that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections." 34 Specifically in the context of § 1512, where the legislature has failed to
include a nexus requirement in the text of the statute itself, prosecutors must take it
upon themselves to exercise discretion and avoid criminalizing behavior that ordinary
citizens-indeed, even the most sophisticated witnesses-would not have thought to
be criminal.
In Aguilar, the Court was concerned that criminalizing Judge Aguilar's behavior
violated the principle that an individual have fair and adequate notice of what
constitutes a crime. Although the Court briefly remarked that it need not reach the
question of vagueness, it went on to state that, absent a nexus requirement, "a man
could be found guilty under § 1503 if he knew of a pending investigation and lied to
his wife about his whereabouts at the time of the crime, thinking that an FBI agent
might decide to interview her and that she might in turn be influenced in her
statement to the agent by her husband's false account of his whereabouts. The intent
clear
to obstruct justice is indeed present, but the man's culpability is a good deal less
35
from the statute than we usually require in order to impose criminal liability."

While the Computer Associates defendants were charged under § 1512(c), not
§ 1503, the prosecutors should have made sure that the Aguilar nexus requirement
was satisfied before bringing this charge. Indeed, the language of sections 1503 and
1512(c) are nearly identical. An individual is liable under § 1503 if he "corruptly ...
influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the
due administration of justice." He is liable under § 1512(c) if he "corruptly ...
obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so."
Because the language of § 1512(c) is as broad as the language of § 1503, the
Supreme Court's overriding concern that society have fair notice of what constitutes
a crime applies with equal force to both statutes. And for the same reason that the
Supreme Court did not see fit to criminalize Aguilar's statements to the FBI agent, it
is equally wrong to criminalize the Computer Associate defendants' statements to
their own company's lawyers. In both cases, the alleged conduct falls beyond what a
"person of ordinary intelligence" would have "contemplated [was] forbidden by the
statute."3 6
There are significant policy reasons to avoid these types of strained prosecutions.
Aikman, Inc. for obstructing an SEC proceeding under 18 U.S.C. §1505 by allegedly seeking to mislead
the company's Audit Committee regarding a matter under investigation by the SEC, while knowing that
the Audit Committee would keep the SEC apprised of its findings); Indictment, United States v.
Singleton, No. 4:04-cr-514-1 (S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 17, 2004) (prosecutors in the Southern District of
Texas charged Greg Singleton, an El Paso Corp. employee, with violating § 1512(c)(2) based on
statements he made to El Paso's outside counsel in the course of an internal investigation).
33. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
34. Id.
35. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599-600 (1995).
36. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
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First, these ill-conceived prosecutions lead to confusion about the demarcation
between legal and illegal behavior, and promote public distrust of prosecutors. The
perceived illegitimacy of these prosecutions may indeed drown many of the societal
benefits received from the otherwis e entirely legitimate and necessary process crime
prosecutions. Second, when obstruction statutes are applied too aggressively and
used to capture conduct occurring in the context of internal corporate investigations,
the result is likely that employees may choose not to cooperate with future internal
investigations. This chilling effect hampers a company's ability. to gather facts, which
may be critical to a company's ability to ferret out, correct, and sanction misconduct,
as well as to the government's ability to rely on corporate cooperation in its own
efforts to investigate and prosecute such misconduct.
By using these statutes to reach conduct only remotely related to an official
proceeding, prosecutors deprive individuals of their constitutional right to be fairly
notified of the proscribed conduct and lose sight of greater policy concerns. In our
society, where the right to remain silent is so deeply protected and the criminal justice
process relies so heavily on witness testimony, it is necessary that prosecutors
continue to charge individuals whose false statements and conduct are intended to
impede government investigations and judicial proceedings. That said, prosecutors
must refrain from criminalizing behavior when a merely tenuous nexus exists between an individual's alleged obstructive acts and the obstructed proceeding. "The
exercise of federal government power to criminalize conduct and thereby to coerce
and to deprive persons ... of their liberty [and] reputation ...must be watched
carefully in a country that values the liberties of its private citizens. Never can we
allow federal prosecutors to make up the law as they go along."3 7

37. United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1996).

